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Keep the rebased workspace green after the backlog closeout

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The ROADMAP #38 closeout was rebased onto a moving main branch. That pulled in
new workspace files whose clippy/rustfmt fixes were required for the exact
verification gate the user asked for. This follow-up records those remaining
cleanups so the pushed branch matches the green tree that was actually tested.

Constraint: The user-required full-workspace fmt/clippy/test sequence had to stay green after rebasing onto newer origin/main
Rejected: Leave the rebase cleanup uncommitted locally | working tree would stay dirty and the pushed branch would not match the verified code
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: When rebasing onto a moving main, commit any gate-fixing follow-up so pushed history matches the verified tree
Tested: cargo fmt --all --check; cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings; cargo test --workspace
Not-tested: No additional behavior beyond the already-green verification sweep
This commit is contained in:
Yeachan-Heo
2026-04-11 18:52:48 +00:00
parent 12d955ac26
commit a7b1fef176
3 changed files with 28 additions and 26 deletions
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24
rust/crates/tools/src/lib.rs
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@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ fn maybe_enforce_permission_check(
}
/// Enforce permission check with a dynamically classified permission mode.
/// Used for tools like bash and PowerShell where the required permission
/// Used for tools like bash and `PowerShell` where the required permission
/// depends on the actual command being executed.
fn maybe_enforce_permission_check_with_mode(
enforcer: Option<&PermissionEnforcer>,
@@ -1820,8 +1820,8 @@ fn from_value<T: for<'de> Deserialize<'de>>(input: &Value) -> Result<T, String>
}
/// Classify bash command permission based on command type and path.
/// ROADMAP #50: Read-only commands targeting CWD paths get WorkspaceWrite,
/// all others remain DangerFullAccess.
/// ROADMAP #50: Read-only commands targeting CWD paths get `WorkspaceWrite`,
/// all others remain `DangerFullAccess`.
fn classify_bash_permission(command: &str) -> PermissionMode {
// Read-only commands that are safe when targeting workspace paths
const READ_ONLY_COMMANDS: &[&str] = &[
@@ -1831,14 +1831,14 @@ fn classify_bash_permission(command: &str) -> PermissionMode {
];
// Get the base command (first word before any args or pipes)
let base_cmd = command.trim().split_whitespace().next().unwrap_or("");
let base_cmd = command.split_whitespace().next().unwrap_or("");
let base_cmd = base_cmd.split('|').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
let base_cmd = base_cmd.split(';').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
let base_cmd = base_cmd.split('>').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
let base_cmd = base_cmd.split('<').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
// Check if it's a read-only command
let cmd_name = base_cmd.split('/').last().unwrap_or(base_cmd);
let cmd_name = base_cmd.split('/').next_back().unwrap_or(base_cmd);
let is_read_only = READ_ONLY_COMMANDS.contains(&cmd_name);
if !is_read_only {
@@ -1869,7 +1869,7 @@ fn has_dangerous_paths(command: &str) -> bool {
if token.starts_with('/') || token.starts_with("~/") {
// Check if it's within CWD
let path =
PathBuf::from(token.replace("~", &std::env::var("HOME").unwrap_or_default()));
PathBuf::from(token.replace('~', &std::env::var("HOME").unwrap_or_default()));
if let Ok(cwd) = std::env::current_dir() {
if !path.starts_with(&cwd) {
return true; // Path outside workspace
@@ -2131,9 +2131,9 @@ fn run_repl(input: ReplInput) -> Result<String, String> {
to_pretty_json(execute_repl(input)?)
}
/// Classify PowerShell command permission based on command type and path.
/// ROADMAP #50: Read-only commands targeting CWD paths get WorkspaceWrite,
/// all others remain DangerFullAccess.
/// Classify `PowerShell` command permission based on command type and path.
/// ROADMAP #50: Read-only commands targeting CWD paths get `WorkspaceWrite`,
/// all others remain `DangerFullAccess`.
fn classify_powershell_permission(command: &str) -> PermissionMode {
// Read-only commands that are safe when targeting workspace paths
const READ_ONLY_COMMANDS: &[&str] = &[
@@ -2165,17 +2165,17 @@ fn classify_powershell_permission(command: &str) -> PermissionMode {
}
}
/// Extract the path argument from a PowerShell command.
/// Extract the path argument from a `PowerShell` command.
fn extract_powershell_path(command: &str) -> Option<String> {
// Look for -Path parameter
if let Some(idx) = command.to_lowercase().find("-path") {
let after_path = &command[idx + 5..];
let path = after_path.trim().split_whitespace().next()?;
let path = after_path.split_whitespace().next()?;
return Some(path.trim_matches('"').trim_matches('\'').to_string());
}
// Look for positional path parameter (after command name)
let parts: Vec<&str> = command.trim().split_whitespace().collect();
let parts: Vec<&str> = command.split_whitespace().collect();
if parts.len() >= 2 {
// Skip the cmdlet name and take the first argument
let first_arg = parts[1];