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Keep the rebased workspace green after the backlog closeout

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The ROADMAP #38 closeout was rebased onto a moving main branch. That pulled in
new workspace files whose clippy/rustfmt fixes were required for the exact
verification gate the user asked for. This follow-up records those remaining
cleanups so the pushed branch matches the green tree that was actually tested.

Constraint: The user-required full-workspace fmt/clippy/test sequence had to stay green after rebasing onto newer origin/main
Rejected: Leave the rebase cleanup uncommitted locally | working tree would stay dirty and the pushed branch would not match the verified code
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: When rebasing onto a moving main, commit any gate-fixing follow-up so pushed history matches the verified tree
Tested: cargo fmt --all --check; cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings; cargo test --workspace
Not-tested: No additional behavior beyond the already-green verification sweep
This commit is contained in:
Yeachan-Heo
2026-04-11 18:52:48 +00:00
parent 12d955ac26
commit a7b1fef176
3 changed files with 28 additions and 26 deletions
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19
rust/crates/plugins/src/test_isolation.rs
View File

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
// Test isolation utilities for plugin tests
// ROADMAP #41: Stop ambient plugin state from skewing CLI regression checks
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::env;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::Mutex;
static TEST_COUNTER: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
static ENV_LOCK: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
@@ -20,25 +20,26 @@ impl EnvLock {
pub fn lock() -> Self {
let guard = ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap();
let count = TEST_COUNTER.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
let temp_home = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("plugin-test-{}", count));
let temp_home = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("plugin-test-{count}"));
// Set up isolated environment
std::fs::create_dir_all(&temp_home).ok();
std::fs::create_dir_all(temp_home.join(".claude/plugins/installed")).ok();
std::fs::create_dir_all(temp_home.join(".config")).ok();
// Redirect HOME and XDG_CONFIG_HOME to temp directory
env::set_var("HOME", &temp_home);
env::set_var("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", temp_home.join(".config"));
env::set_var("XDG_DATA_HOME", temp_home.join(".local/share"));
EnvLock {
_guard: guard,
temp_home,
}
}
/// Get the temporary home directory for this test
#[must_use]
pub fn temp_home(&self) -> &PathBuf {
&self.temp_home
}
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ impl Drop for EnvLock {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_env_lock_creates_isolated_home() {
let lock = EnvLock::lock();
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ mod tests {
assert!(home.contains("plugin-test-"));
assert_eq!(home, lock.temp_home().to_str().unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn test_env_lock_creates_plugin_directories() {
let lock = EnvLock::lock();

11
rust/crates/rusty-claude-cli/src/main.rs
View File

@@ -11521,22 +11521,23 @@ mod dump_manifests_tests {
let result = dump_manifests_at_path(&temp_dir, CliOutputFormat::Text);
// Assert that the call fails
assert!(result.is_err(), "expected an error when manifests are missing");
assert!(
result.is_err(),
"expected an error when manifests are missing"
);
let error_msg = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
// Assert the error message contains "Manifest files (commands.ts, tools.ts)"
assert!(
error_msg.contains("Manifest files (commands.ts, tools.ts)"),
"error message should mention manifest files: {}",
error_msg
"error message should mention manifest files: {error_msg}"
);
// Assert the error message contains the expected path
assert!(
error_msg.contains(&temp_dir.display().to_string()),
"error message should contain the expected path: {}",
error_msg
"error message should contain the expected path: {error_msg}"
);
});

24
rust/crates/tools/src/lib.rs
View File

@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ fn maybe_enforce_permission_check(
}
/// Enforce permission check with a dynamically classified permission mode.
/// Used for tools like bash and PowerShell where the required permission
/// Used for tools like bash and `PowerShell` where the required permission
/// depends on the actual command being executed.
fn maybe_enforce_permission_check_with_mode(
enforcer: Option<&PermissionEnforcer>,
@@ -1820,8 +1820,8 @@ fn from_value<T: for<'de> Deserialize<'de>>(input: &Value) -> Result<T, String>
}
/// Classify bash command permission based on command type and path.
/// ROADMAP #50: Read-only commands targeting CWD paths get WorkspaceWrite,
/// all others remain DangerFullAccess.
/// ROADMAP #50: Read-only commands targeting CWD paths get `WorkspaceWrite`,
/// all others remain `DangerFullAccess`.
fn classify_bash_permission(command: &str) -> PermissionMode {
// Read-only commands that are safe when targeting workspace paths
const READ_ONLY_COMMANDS: &[&str] = &[
@@ -1831,14 +1831,14 @@ fn classify_bash_permission(command: &str) -> PermissionMode {
];
// Get the base command (first word before any args or pipes)
let base_cmd = command.trim().split_whitespace().next().unwrap_or("");
let base_cmd = command.split_whitespace().next().unwrap_or("");
let base_cmd = base_cmd.split('|').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
let base_cmd = base_cmd.split(';').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
let base_cmd = base_cmd.split('>').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
let base_cmd = base_cmd.split('<').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
// Check if it's a read-only command
let cmd_name = base_cmd.split('/').last().unwrap_or(base_cmd);
let cmd_name = base_cmd.split('/').next_back().unwrap_or(base_cmd);
let is_read_only = READ_ONLY_COMMANDS.contains(&cmd_name);
if !is_read_only {
@@ -1869,7 +1869,7 @@ fn has_dangerous_paths(command: &str) -> bool {
if token.starts_with('/') || token.starts_with("~/") {
// Check if it's within CWD
let path =
PathBuf::from(token.replace("~", &std::env::var("HOME").unwrap_or_default()));
PathBuf::from(token.replace('~', &std::env::var("HOME").unwrap_or_default()));
if let Ok(cwd) = std::env::current_dir() {
if !path.starts_with(&cwd) {
return true; // Path outside workspace
@@ -2131,9 +2131,9 @@ fn run_repl(input: ReplInput) -> Result<String, String> {
to_pretty_json(execute_repl(input)?)
}
/// Classify PowerShell command permission based on command type and path.
/// ROADMAP #50: Read-only commands targeting CWD paths get WorkspaceWrite,
/// all others remain DangerFullAccess.
/// Classify `PowerShell` command permission based on command type and path.
/// ROADMAP #50: Read-only commands targeting CWD paths get `WorkspaceWrite`,
/// all others remain `DangerFullAccess`.
fn classify_powershell_permission(command: &str) -> PermissionMode {
// Read-only commands that are safe when targeting workspace paths
const READ_ONLY_COMMANDS: &[&str] = &[
@@ -2165,17 +2165,17 @@ fn classify_powershell_permission(command: &str) -> PermissionMode {
}
}
/// Extract the path argument from a PowerShell command.
/// Extract the path argument from a `PowerShell` command.
fn extract_powershell_path(command: &str) -> Option<String> {
// Look for -Path parameter
if let Some(idx) = command.to_lowercase().find("-path") {
let after_path = &command[idx + 5..];
let path = after_path.trim().split_whitespace().next()?;
let path = after_path.split_whitespace().next()?;
return Some(path.trim_matches('"').trim_matches('\'').to_string());
}
// Look for positional path parameter (after command name)
let parts: Vec<&str> = command.trim().split_whitespace().collect();
let parts: Vec<&str> = command.split_whitespace().collect();
if parts.len() >= 2 {
// Skip the cmdlet name and take the first argument
let first_arg = parts[1];