Compare commits

...
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
YeonGyu-KimandGitHub b71afddae1 Merge pull request #3280 from Einspanner123/fix/sandbox-map-auto-fallback
fix(sandbox): fall back to --map-auto when root-user mapping is restricted
2026-08-06 20:18:35 +09:00
code-yeongyuandlinkst 525035b51b fix(sandbox): probe the full launcher shape, not just the mapping
The startup probe validated only the mapping flags against the trivial
program `true`, but the real launcher always adds
--mount --ipc --pid --uts --fork. On environments where the user
namespace is created but mount propagation inside it is restricted
(e.g. AppArmor-restricted CI runners), the fallback mapping passed the
probe and the sandbox activated, yet every sandboxed command died with
"cannot change root filesystem propagation: Permission denied",
silently returning empty tool output and breaking the mock parity
suite.

The candidates now define the complete static launcher shape (mapping
flags + namespace flags), so probe success implies launch success; the
launcher reuses the candidate instead of re-appending the namespace
flags, keeping probe and launch as one source of truth. The
order-guarding test asserts the namespace flags are present in every
candidate.

Co-authored-by: linkst <2024023709@m.scnu.edu.cn>
2026-08-06 19:41:27 +09:00
linkst 9cbe6d9a8c docs(sandbox): document newuidmap/newgidmap dependency for --map-auto fallback
The fallback candidate relies on the setuid newuidmap/newgidmap helpers
(uidmap package) plus a subuid/subgid range for the current user. Note in
the candidate docs that the startup probe rejects the candidate when those
are missing, so the plain --map-root-user form is used instead.
2026-08-01 15:21:56 +08:00
linkst 277fdda894 fix(sandbox): fall back to --map-auto when root-user mapping is restricted
Plain `unshare --user --map-root-user` fails on kernels and containers
that block unprivileged writes to /proc/self/uid_map (e.g. GitHub Actions,
restricted AppArmor profiles). On those systems util-linux delegates to the
setuid newuidmap/newgidmap helpers when --map-auto is also present.

Add the combined form as a fallback candidate and build the launcher args
from the probed mapping, so systems without newuidmap/newgidmap or a
/etc/subuid range keep using the plain form.
2026-07-31 17:09:00 +08:00
linkst 1c8338ea66 refactor(sandbox): extract unshare mapping probe into cached helper
No behavior change. Move the inline probe out of
unshare_user_namespace_works into a reusable unshare_probe helper and a
cached working_unshare_mapping() that picks the first working candidate
from UNSHARE_MAPPING_CANDIDATES, so the launcher and the capability probe
share one code path.
2026-07-31 17:08:51 +08:00
+131 -16
View File
@@ -220,15 +220,14 @@ pub fn build_linux_sandbox_command(
return None;
}
let mut args = vec![
"--user".to_string(),
"--map-root-user".to_string(),
"--mount".to_string(),
"--ipc".to_string(),
"--pid".to_string(),
"--uts".to_string(),
"--fork".to_string(),
];
let mut args: Vec<String> = working_unshare_mapping()
.unwrap_or(UNSHARE_MAPPING_CANDIDATES[0])
.iter()
.map(|arg| arg.to_string())
.collect();
// The candidates already carry the namespace flags, so the probe and the
// launcher share a single argument shape; only the opt-in `--net` is
// added here.
if status.network_active {
args.push("--net".to_string());
}
@@ -282,6 +281,82 @@ fn command_exists(command: &str) -> bool {
.is_some_and(|paths| env::split_paths(&paths).any(|path| path.join(command).exists()))
}
/// Candidate `unshare` user-namespace mapping options, in preference order.
///
/// Most systems accept `--map-root-user` alone. Some hardened containers and
/// seccomp profiles block unprivileged writes to `/proc/self/uid_map`; there,
/// util-linux delegates to the setuid `newuidmap`/`newgidmap` helpers when
/// `--map-auto` is also present.
///
/// That fallback therefore depends on the setuid helpers (the `uidmap`
/// package on Debian/Ubuntu) and on the current user having a range in
/// `/etc/subuid` and `/etc/subgid`. When either is missing, `--map-auto`
/// fails and the startup probe rejects the candidate, keeping the plain form.
///
/// Each candidate is the **complete** static argument shape the launcher
/// uses (see `build_linux_sandbox_command`): mapping flags followed by the
/// namespace flags `--mount --ipc --pid --uts --fork`. The startup probe
/// runs each candidate verbatim (plus a trivial program), so probe success
/// implies launch success: on systems where the mapping works but the
/// namespace flags are denied (e.g. AppArmor-restricted CI runners that
/// block mount propagation in user namespaces), the probe fails and the
/// sandbox stays disabled instead of activating a launcher that always
/// errors.
///
/// `--net` is intentionally absent: it is appended only when network
/// isolation is active (the non-default path), and probing with it would
/// disable the sandbox on hosts that block network-namespace creation (e.g.
/// Docker's default seccomp profile) even when network isolation is never
/// requested.
const UNSHARE_MAPPING_CANDIDATES: &[&[&str]] = &[
&[
"--user",
"--map-root-user",
"--mount",
"--ipc",
"--pid",
"--uts",
"--fork",
],
&[
"--user",
"--map-root-user",
"--map-auto",
"--mount",
"--ipc",
"--pid",
"--uts",
"--fork",
],
];
/// Probe a candidate `unshare` mapping invocation with a trivial program.
fn unshare_probe(args: &[&str]) -> bool {
std::process::Command::new("unshare")
.args(args)
.arg("true")
.stdin(std::process::Stdio::null())
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
.status()
.is_ok_and(|status| status.success())
}
/// The first mapping option set that works on this machine, if any.
///
/// Probes are cached for the process lifetime; a missing `unshare` binary or a
/// kernel that refuses every mapping yields `None`.
fn working_unshare_mapping() -> Option<&'static [&'static str]> {
use std::sync::OnceLock;
static MAPPING: OnceLock<Option<&'static [&'static str]>> = OnceLock::new();
*MAPPING.get_or_init(|| {
UNSHARE_MAPPING_CANDIDATES
.iter()
.copied()
.find(|args| unshare_probe(args))
})
}
/// Check whether `unshare --user` actually works on this system.
/// On some CI environments (e.g. GitHub Actions), the binary exists but
/// user namespaces are restricted, causing silent failures.
@@ -292,13 +367,7 @@ fn unshare_user_namespace_works() -> bool {
if !command_exists("unshare") {
return false;
}
std::process::Command::new("unshare")
.args(["--user", "--map-root-user", "true"])
.stdin(std::process::Stdio::null())
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
.status()
.is_ok_and(|status| status.success())
working_unshare_mapping().is_some()
})
}
@@ -359,6 +428,52 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(request.allowed_mounts, vec!["tmp"]);
}
#[test]
fn mapping_candidates_prefer_plain_root_mapping() {
assert!(!super::UNSHARE_MAPPING_CANDIDATES.is_empty());
for candidate in super::UNSHARE_MAPPING_CANDIDATES {
// Mapping flags.
assert!(candidate.contains(&"--user"));
assert!(candidate.contains(&"--map-root-user"));
// Namespace flags the real launcher appends — the probe must
// exercise the full invocation shape, not just mapping flags.
assert!(candidate.contains(&"--mount"));
assert!(candidate.contains(&"--ipc"));
assert!(candidate.contains(&"--pid"));
assert!(candidate.contains(&"--uts"));
assert!(candidate.contains(&"--fork"));
}
// The plain form must be tried first; `--map-auto` is only a fallback
// for kernels/containers that block unprivileged uid_map writes.
assert_eq!(
super::UNSHARE_MAPPING_CANDIDATES[0],
&[
"--user",
"--map-root-user",
"--mount",
"--ipc",
"--pid",
"--uts",
"--fork",
]
);
// The second candidate inserts `--map-auto` in the position util-linux
// expects (after `--map-root-user`, before the namespace flags).
assert_eq!(
super::UNSHARE_MAPPING_CANDIDATES[1],
&[
"--user",
"--map-root-user",
"--map-auto",
"--mount",
"--ipc",
"--pid",
"--uts",
"--fork",
]
);
}
#[test]
fn builds_linux_launcher_with_network_flag_when_requested() {
let config = SandboxConfig::default();